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TAGS: [PREL](#) [NATO](#) [PGOV](#) [KCFE](#) [RS](#)
SUBJECT: NATO-RUSSIA WAY FORWARD: READOUT OF OCTOBER 14 SPC
MEETING

Classified By: Charge W. S. Reid. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Allies delivered their initial responses to the IS-drafted policy paper "NATO-Russia Relations in the Aftermath of the Georgia Crisis." At its base, the document's language of "targeted conditionality" and "selective engagement" and emphasis on unity pleased most Allies. France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Norway and others supported what the French described as a targeted paper focused on NATO-Russia concrete results and maintaining a coherence with the EU's approach to Russia. These Allies focused narrowly on the current situation and cooperation in the context of the NRC. Others (the Baltic Republics, Poland, Czech Republic, Denmark, UK and Canada) called for a much broader document with aim to analyze trends in NATO-Russia relations and set forth both short and long term goals for the relationship. Those same Allies sought to look beyond merely the NRC, which, as one Ally suggested, was concieved in the Yeltsin era and now must be revisited in the Putin/Medvedev era. Many of these Allies advocated the inclusion of reference to principles and values as the basis for NATO policy. END SUMMARY

¶2. (S/NF) Allies broke into familiar lines of argument during their October 13 Senior Political Committee discussion of the IS-drafted paper "NATO-Russia Relations in the Aftermath of the Georgia Crisis." In order of intervention (NOTE: Most Allies had only preliminary guidance and expected detailed instruction later. End note.):

-- Romania: Supported the pragmatism of the paper and encouraged a step-by-step approach that remained flexible as Russia implemented the two agreements. They were particularly supportive of the references to unity and pre-coordination as helpful towards a long term approach but also advocated specific reference to principles and values.

-- Lithuania: Considered the paper a good first step but felt it concentrated too much on "realpolitik" and lacked emphasis on principles and values. Also spoke against the notion of the NRC as the only available tool in N-R relations,

arguing the NRC was conceived in the Yeltsin era and we must reconsider the vastly different parameters of the NRC of the Putin/Medvedev era.

-- Norway: Strongly supported the document and continued dialogue with Russia, refusing to challenge the basis of the NRC, as previous speakers suggested. Reacting to the rhetoric of the paper he urged Allies to realize that Russia would not always simply take what NATO put on the table.

-- Latvia: Believed the document was narrowly focused on the NRC, was full of assumptions and not facts, and lacked reference to principles and values as guiding posts for engagement. Overall, the paper did not properly characterize "what Russia is." Advocated referencing back to a 2007 document produced in the PC which provided such an analysis and tasking further updating of that paper, perhaps in the Political Committee.

-- Bulgaria: Supported the document and, as others, supported the necessity of unity and pre-coordination and advocated inclusion of reference to principles and values. They also advocated an approach that progressed incrementally based on Russian fulfillment of agreements.

-- Canada: Took a particularly firm stance: strong advocate of broadening the paper and looking beyond just the NRC toward N-R relations in a larger context and in the longer term. The paper should "remind Russians what the relationship is based on." They even asked: "Is the NRC what we want? Are there other channels?" They advocated

looking at trends, elaborating the NATO view on Medvedev's European security treaty idea and considering NATO policy on the CFE.

-- Poland: Strong advocate of broadening the document, analyzing Russian intentions on the international stage and looking beyond the NRC. The paper needs to reflect "how far Russia has gone from Yeltsin" and how Russia has strained the N-R relationship by translating strong rhetoric into action..."not just in Georgia."

-- France: Believed the document was extremely good, well-structured, realistic and opportune. They do not believe the paper needs to go beyond the current crisis, must remain "targeted" on specific outputs, and believe it should stick to the NRC. They strongly supported references to Alliance unity and emphasized the necessity for coherence between NATO and other international organizations.

-- Estonia: Argued that there were missing parts in the document particularly reference to principles and values and stated facts on Russia's breach of principles of international law. They believed the paper needs to be done "unattached to the Georgian crisis" and reflect how the Alliance has changed its views, attitudes and perceptions.

-- Slovenia: Viewed the document as a "good starting point," QQQY0QQQ "Q#QQ." They urged that "no stone remain unturned" and also advocated reference to principles and values.

-- Slovakia: Appreciated the document's emphasis on Russian ownership and supported its emphasis on Alliance unity and consistency with other organizations (in particular the EU). They also believed strongly that the document should determine clear limits - that there be no new spheres of influence and each country is free to choose its own security alliance.

-- Spain: Supported the document but did not support other Allies in their call at this stage for long-term thinking. They believe values are important "but commitments are too" and the NRC is necessary for both Russia and NATO as a strategic partner. They supported a narrow document focusing on the present situation and advocating an end to

the conflict in Georgia.

-- Hungary: Supported a broadening of the document to include more analysis (extending even to analysis of Russian military and economic trends) and believed there is no rush for consensus, as the paper should have a long-term outlook. They supported the idea of unity and advocated looking at both the worst and best case scenario in the present situation.

-- Czech Rep: Strong advocate of an explicit reference to guiding principles such as those in the NRC Founding Act and the August NATO Foreign Ministers' statement. They expressed hesitancy with parts of the text. In particular, they expressed caution on references to political dialogue, which leave too much room for a return to business as usual. Also, they did not feel Medvedev's security treaty proposal was relevant to the paper.

-- Iceland: Supportive of the document but, as others, advocated reference to principles and values, broader analysis in the paper and a longer-term perspective.

-- Denmark: Considered the document "not at all bad" but lacking in a more general analysis of N-R relations as a point of departure to examine NATO policy aims. They were supportive of the ideas of selective engagement and unity but would like to see the analysis in regards to ongoing N-R activities more developed.

-- Italy: Supporter of the document and strong advocate of a very narrow scope for the paper. A long-term strategy beyond the current situation is "not in the mandate" for the document, they argued. They contend that the issue is not if the NRC is used but rather how, and the paper already has room for evaluation of the NRC.

-- Turkey: Described its position as 120 percent aligned with Canada in regards to a need for reflection on the "broader picture." They acknowledged that we are "living in an exceptional time," but advocated the need for reflection on changes in N-R relations.

-- UK: (NOTE: Delegate mentioned before the meeting that they had not yet received any official instruction from London. End note.) Considered the document a good initial effort and, as others, saw need to underscore the principles and values on which the relationship is based. They focused attention to remaining issues on the ground in Georgia and sighted Kouchner as himself recognizing that compliance thus far has only been partial.

-- Germany: Strongly supported the paper and particularly supported its emphasis on coordination/consistency with efforts of other organizations, even going so far as to call for "synchronization" with the EU efforts. They were very cautious on "overloading" the paper with references to principles and values at this "transition moment."

-- Greece: Supported the document and warned Allies not to be "overly ambitious" by discussing various issues in depth. (He suggested the EU was going faster on this which does not look good for the Alliance.) They also advocate incorporation of Russian perspectives (i.e. Russian foreign policy principles) into the document.

-- US: A/DCM pointed out that the document needed a "goals" section to know why we were doing N-R cooperation, as well as a "yardstick element so we can track whether we are making progress. Examples of short-term goals were to get Russia out of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In Medium-to-longer term we needed to convince Russia to drop its zero sum security philosophy and buy into cooperative security. Also suggested we should discuss other NATO tools and opportunities to shape Russian

conduct, like the EAPC, energy security, relations to GG/UP, and other NATO policies which Russia follows with interest. We should also examine our ineffective NATO public diplomacy on Russia.

-- Netherlands: Had no criticism of the document but noted particular support for EU-NATO unity as provided for in the paper.

-- Portugal: Suggested the Allies refer back to paragraph 27 of the Bucharest communique for wording which registers NATO concerns and principles and has potential for use in this situation.

-- Belgium: Supported the document and aligned itself with the positions of France, Germany and Italy.

-- Luxembourg: Supportive of document; generally aligned their comments with those of Germany, Italy, Norway and Spain.

13. (S/NF) SPC Chairman, Assistant Secretary General Erdmann also reported on a meeting he had with Russian Ambassador Rogozin. Erdmann said that Rogozin asserted that Moscow still was interested in pursuing the NATO-Russia relationship, wanted to have a NRC Foreign Ministerial in December, wanted to resume NATO-Russia mil-to-mil contacts and wanted to discuss NATO-Russia cooperation on counter-piracy. The Chairman informed Rogozin that the IMS had tried to confirm with the Russian MoD that Russia was interested in resuming mil-to-mil contacts after an earlier

Rogozin assertion to that effect and had been unsuccessful. In reply, Rogozin asserted that resumption was Russia's policy. The Chairman told Allies to await further IMS independent corroboration.

REID